


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25 October 1955



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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2, 100
DATE: 5 JAN 1956 REVIEWER: 

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
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CONTENTS

1. SOVIET UNION AND YEMEN MAY ESTABLISH
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (page 3).



4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AFGHANISTAN IMPLEMENT
THEIR ARMS DEAL (page 7).
5. MOLOTOV VOICES OPTIMISM ABOUT GENEVA
CONFERENCE (page 8).
6. THE SAAR REFERENDUM (page 9).

25 Oct 55

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

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
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1. SOVIET UNION AND YEMEN MAY ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS


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A Soviet delegation is expected in Taiz soon to discuss the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Yemen, according to the Yemeni representative in Aden. He said the Imam of Yemen, motivated by anti-British feeling and inspired by the Egyptian example, probably will seek arms from the USSR.

The American consul in Aden comments that Yemeni permission for the opening of a Soviet mission would be in marked contrast to the government's attitude toward Italian and French requests for permission to open legations, which have been ignored for months.

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


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4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AFGHANISTAN IMPLEMENT THEIR ARMS DEAL

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[REDACTED] Afghanistan has accepted an invitation to send a military mission to tour Czech arms factories in the near future, according to a Radio Kabul broadcast of 20 October. The American army attaché in Kabul believes the delegation will probably number from 10 to 12 Afghan officers.

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[REDACTED] two Czech arms experts from the Skoda works arrived in the capital in mid-October. [REDACTED]

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Comment

Afghanistan negotiated a [REDACTED] arms deal with Czechoslovakia in August 1955. The Afghan military mission to Czechoslovakia and the Czech experts in Kabul are probably concerned with the inspection and delivery of these arms.

Afghanistan's regular military forces number about 60,000 troops, with only a small supply of antiquated equipment. Most of the [REDACTED] purchase will probably be small arms. In view of the tension with Pakistan, however, Kabul would probably also be interested in other deals covering heavier equipment if sufficiently attractive offers were made.

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5. MOLOTOV VOICES OPTIMISM ABOUT GENEVA CONFERENCE

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Soviet foreign minister Molotov, in a talk with French ambassador Joxe on 21 October, made a show of optimism regarding the forthcoming Big

Four foreign ministers' conference and said that recent statements of the American position augured well for the outcome of the conference. He indicated he was willing to remain in Geneva a long time.

Molotov emphasized the importance of East-West contacts and gave Joxe the impression he expects a good portion of the conference to be devoted to this issue. He said the USSR attached the greatest importance to an effective security system. He felt that this problem could not be solved at Geneva, but that progress on it was possible there. He also felt that positions on disarmament were drawing closer.

Comment

Recent Soviet propaganda has been optimistic about the prospects for progress on disarmament and on East-West contacts. Soviet propaganda and statements by high Soviet officials have denied, however, the possibility of agreements on German unification or on European security if the West continues to link that question to German unity.

6. THE SAAR REFERENDUM

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The 2 to 1 margin of victory by the pro-German forces in the 23 October Saar referendum has been followed by the resignation of pro-French Saar premier Johannes Hoffmann and his cabinet. However, Hoffmann and the cabinet presumably remain in a caretaker status, since the Saar constitution makes no provision for the resignation of the premier in the absence of a no-confidence vote by the Landtag, which is not in session.

The Faure government will probably wait until the initial wave of French press and parliamentary bitterness has subsided before entering any new negotiations with West Germany over the status of the Saar. France has little chance of reimposing its control.

Bonn is expected to propose that, pending such negotiations, the area remain temporarily under jurisdiction of the Western European Union. The British would probably support such a move. The WEU supervisory commission was originally to remain in the Saar only to verify the vote. Its jurisdiction seems sufficiently vague, however, to permit it to act in emergencies, and for the immediate present, Paris would probably be relieved to have WEU assume such a responsibility.

Pro-German elements are not represented in the present Landtag and will probably redouble pressure for new elections.

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